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Demonopolization of urban transport in Poland has been lasting for almost two decades, 
whereas 17 years have passed since first Public Transport Authorities (PTAs) were 
established in 1992. At the same time Polish towns have independently looked for ways of 
efficient public transport organisation, reaching out for many methods inspired by solutions 
used worldwide but at the same time taking into account domestic restrictions.  
 
It has resulted in a wide variety of experiences – starting with Elbląg, which divided and 
privatised the public bus operator and now all services are tendered by a PTA, and finishing 
with Zielona Góra, where the operator continues to function as a budget entity (a public sector 
entity without separate legal personality that covers its costs directly from the city budget) and 
manages the transport system on his own within a ‘German’ model. There are numerous other 
solutions in between – among others private-public companies in Tczew (with a private 
partner as a majority stock holder) and in Kalisz (with a public partner as a majority stock 
holder), competition between private and public operators in Gdynia, or separating a part of 
the market for free competition while preserving the dominant role of a public operator in 
Warsaw. The discussed cases were in detail presented in the paper at the European Transport 
Conference (Wolański, 2007). 
 
Such a wide variety creates possibilities of comparing efficiency of particular urban transport 
organisation systems implemented in similar realities, which was the subject of the author’s 
doctoral dissertation entitled “Economic efficiency of urban transport demonopolization in 
Poland”. This paper presents a part of econometric modelling results, created for the needs of 
that thesis with the help of Stochastic Frontier Analysis – the state-of-the-art method of 
efficiency measurement. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Efficiency measurement model used in this paper has been based on an analysis of the cost of 
purchase or production of a buskilometre in different towns, which is consistent with previous 
research done in Poland among others by R. Tomanek (2002). The most important innovation 
is taking into account the fact that differentiation of the cost may result from many other 
factors, than an organisational model, such as vehicle type, its size, age and equipment. 
 
The cost-based approach is reasonable in as much as in the case of a vast majority of Polish 
towns it is the public side that decides about qualitative aspects of the carriage offer, 
preparing at least a time-table outline, putting forward specified quality requirements and 
finally shaping the price policy. Therefore a public body usually ‘buys buskilometres’ and 
makes its own decisions concerning their use. The quality of this use, i.e. adapting the offer to 
market needs, does not directly result from the operator’s ownership issues. 
 
A disadvantage of such an attitude is impossibility to take into account the cities where local 
governments settle accounts with operators on net basis (the operator gets a farebox and a 
fixed subsidy) but the number of implementations of such a solution in Poland is very small 
indeed, thus we may assume that it would not lead to statistically significant results. 
 
With this kind of approach, it is a good solution within the scope of modelling to use 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis. It is based on the assumption that the cost function may be 
defined by an equation (Greene, 2007, E33-1-3): 
 
where in this case: 
• y denotes the cost of buskilometre for given services;    
•  – parameters of a given transport service (such as bus length, age, etc.), multiplied 
by their estimated influence on costs (negative or positive); 
• v – random variable with normal distribution, showing different kinds of objective 
cost deviations, not providing for inefficiency but resulting from factors not included 
in the model;   
• u – inefficiency, a random variable with half-normal distribution, thus accepting only 
non-negative values. 
 
The first element denotes deterministic part of the cost, which together with v create so-called 
cost frontier, i.e. a kind of idealised minimum cost; after deducting this cost each observation 
is characterised by non-negative inefficiency u (Greene, 2007, E33-1-3).  
 
The variable u in this paper is defined as ‘absolute inefficiency’ in contrast to ‘relative 
inefficiency’ denoted by (Coelli, 1996, 9): 
 
 
Therefore u itself illustrates the value of inefficiency expressed in currency (PLN – polish 
zloty). On the other hand ‘relative inefficiency’ is a no dimension value showing inefficiency 
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in relation to the deterministic element of cost frontier. And thus relative inefficiency 
amounting to 24% means that – excluding the random element v – the real remuneration paid 
to the operator equals 124% of deterministic element of cost frontier, while equalling 50% 
means that the remuneration equals 150% of this element. 
 
W. Greene (2007, E33-4) underlines that as a rule, especially in the case of classic Cobb-
Douglas’s production function, particular explanatory variables (xi) may denote logarithms of 
particular inputs.  
 
The choice of parameters of vector ß is achieved by using the method of maximum 
likelihood. 
 
An essential advantage of SFA is taking into account that not each variation from the 
forecasted value means inefficiency, which is secured by random variable v. Whereas using 
SFA one should remember that defined coefficients ß do not mean average dependence, for 
the deterministic element of the equation is closer to the “ideal” than to a “typical case”, as in 
the case of linear regression.  
 
In order to carry out research, first a set of potential variables explaining the price of a 
buskilometre or being able to differentiate the effectiveness of concluded contracts, such as 
the vehicle’s age or size, the period of the contract, mean speed on given routes etc., have 
been set. 
 
Then the necessary data allowing to create a data base for a model have been collected. Some 
of them were taken from a statistical journal published in Polish on a six-month basis “Urban 
communication in numbers” (2007) by Polish Chamber of Urban Transport (IGKM) – they 
were available only in the case of carriers operating without the Polish Transport Authorities. 
The remaining data should be collected within the questionnaire, conducted in the first half of 
2008, directed to all PTAs, that are IGKM members as well as to some other smaller transport 
authorities. 
 
The data base record was a single value of dependent variable, i.e. a gross price expressed in 
PLN per kilometre, paid to the operator by the Public Transport Authority (adjusted by the 
municipal company’s profit or loss), or a mean cost of performing a service in a municipal 
company acting in a model without PTA (‘German’ model). This value might refer to the 
whole network or even to a single service. Therefore it was necessary to weigh the data 
implicitly using the number of services the given rate concerned. Under the term service we in 
principle understand one bus in motion, although in some cases it is possible for one vehicle 
to perform two services obtained in different bids, e.g. on day and night lines. However, these 
are very rare phenomena.  
 
In this way a data base including facts on 281 transport services rates, within which transport 
services were provided for 12 PTAs by 4002 buses, was created. It was connected with 
secondary data for 18 towns operating without the PTA. These operators together run 1546 
buses on average working day basis. The difference of scale was unavoidable and resulted 
from the specifity of demonopolization in Poland.  
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On account of diversity of dependent variables, in the case of towns where transport services 
are performed directly by public companies and towns where transport authorities exist, an 
assumption of creating two models has been adopted: 
• the first model, a general one, concerning all towns independently of whether transport 
authorities were established there or not; 
• the second model, related only and solely to contracts concluded within tenders by 
operators and transport authorities (independently of its organisational form – this 
criterion should be treated as functional), where a set of potential dependent variables 
may be somewhat bigger. 
 
In practice these models turned out to be much more similar than had been expected; 
nevertheless their diversity was maintained in order to obtain more precise results.   
RESEARCH RESULTS 
The created models 
A number of attempts allowed creating three statistically significant models, out of which one 
concerned the whole of researched services and two referred only to transportation tasks 
granted in the course of a tender. 
 
Trials with both linear and logarithmic dependence were simultaneously conducted for some 
variables, while the chosen ones guaranteed higher reliability. Whereas in none of the models 
logically correct and statistically significant dependencies were obtained between cost, and 
among others: 
• the size of an order granted to a given operator – in this case in a parallel linear 
regression model even an inverse proportionality was observed; the reason for this 
may have been the fact that setting the cost frontier was obstructed by existence of 
groups of big and inefficient public operators; it needs stressing that a similar 
proportionality was already observed by Miller (1970); 
• the amount of average wage in a given region – probably it was more diverse than 
drivers’ wages due to a different inhabitants’ professional structure and also on 
account of a general practice of drivers commuting from suburban areas, where wage 
expectations are lower and more even nationwide. 
 
It was also necessary to resign from the assumed weights in the form of a number of services 
and substituting it by a logarithm of the same value. 
 
The obtained models are presented in the following tables.   
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Table 1. Stochastic buskilometre cost frontier – all services. 
Variable Coefficient Standard error Critical significance level 
Constant 3.750 0.536 ≤0.01 
Average length of a bus [m] 0.130 0.016 ≤0.01 
Average log of bus age [years] -1.038 0.302 ≤0.01 
 Annual bus mileage  [kkm/year] -0.007 0.002 ≤0.01 
Share of low floor buses [%] 0.641 0.153 ≤0.01 
Average speed (incl. stops) [km/h] -0.027 0.015 ≤0.05 
 
Table 2. Stochastic buskilometre cost frontier – tendered services (model A). 
Variable Coefficient Standard error Critical significance level 
Constant 3.296 0.594 ≤0.01 
Average length of a bus [m] 0.128 0.022 ≤0.01 
Average log of bus age [years] -0.807 0.440 ≤0.10 
Annual bus mileage [kkm/year] -0.006 0.003 ≤0.05 
Share of low floor buses [%] 0.561 0.189 ≤0.01 
Average speed (incl. stops) [km/h] -0.041 0.028 ≤0.15 
 
Table 3. Stochastic buskilometre cost frontier – tendered services (model B). 
Variable Coefficient Standard error Critical significance level 
Constant 2.491 0.583 ≤0.01 
Average length of a bus [m] 0.138 0.023 ≤0.01 
Average log of bus age [years] -0.726 0.327 ≤0.05 
Annual bus mileage [kkm/year] -0.007 0.002 ≤0.01 
Share of low floor buses [%] 0.479 0.172 ≤0.05 
Share of buses equipped in AC and CCTV [%] 
(if only AC / only CCTV, than 0.5 of the value) 
0.499 0.348 ≤0.20 (0.151) 
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An analysis of efficiency of organisational models 
 
Graph 1. Relative inefficiency according to organizational scheme, operator ownership & award type 
 
The created models allow drawing a number of important conclusions. Primarily, comparing 
relative efficiency depending on organizational scheme, operator ownership and award type 
(comp. graph 1) indicates a much higher efficiency of private and public operators who 
received orders in the course of tendering rather than of the remaining public companies. If a 
public operator gets an order in the course of tendering, with the existence of PTA, the cost is 
12% lower in relation to direct award (an average cost equalling 129% of cost frontier instead 
of 146% of cost frontier). 
 
If a private operator wins the tender, the cost is on average by another 2% lower. In the case 
of private operators who received contracts under the direct award procedure, attention should 
be drawn to a small number of services and the fact that these orders were awarded in mid-
90ties, when the Public Procurement Act was not in force yet; nevertheless those contracts 
were preceded by negotiations. Hence the private operators’ efficiency should be considered 
jointly, on assumption that in both cases they were chosen in the course of competition. 
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It is surprising that public companies operating without PTAs are much more efficient than 
those operating within PTAs’ direct awards despite a part of competences and costs being 
taken over by these entities. Therefore it means that the dominant way of transport 
organization in Poland is the least efficient, which results from “artificial” establishment of 
PTAs, which anyway are forced to outsource services of a particular operator and have 
limited influence of them. Obviously, this is an ascertainment of the dominant state of the 
facts. In theory and in some practical cases it is possible to establish healthy relations between 
contracting authority and operator, as between normal customer and seller. Then the 
possibility of the external quality control is an essential advantage. 
 
Graph 2. Absolute inefficiency according to organizational scheme, operator ownership & award type 
 
The situation looks somewhat different if absolute efficiency expressed in Polish zlotys 
(comp. graph 2, 1 PLN ≈ 4.4 EUR) is considered. In this case the difference between 
efficiency of private and public operators receiving contracts in the course of tenders becomes 
more pronounced. This discrepancy may result from a number of possibilities:   
• private operators provide services with a lower cost frontier, thus of lower quality (e.g. 
older bus fleet) or on more advantageous principles (e.g. longer-term contracts or 
higher yearly mileage); 
• after all public operators provide twice more services won in the course of tendering 
than private operators, which results from a certain number of tenders in which private 
operators find it difficult to satisfy the criteria (e.g. the requirement of owning a bus 
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fleet at the moment of tendering); this causes “overvaluing” the cost frontier in case of 
specific contracts for public operators; 
 
It is also important, that some municipal operators provide services both on the basis of direct 
awards and tenders – in this case higher incomes from direct awards may allow them to offer 
lower prices in tenders, which creates an illusory efficiency of this form of placing orders. 
This has been proven by an analysis of single operators. 
 
It is also worth paying attention to the fact that the shown buskilometre cost of public 
operators does not illustrate the entire costs incurred by local authorities, including costs of 
lost opportunities to which the author had no access. For example, private operators purchase 
or lease land on their own, while municipal operators may use land contributed to the 
company by a town. 
 
Graph 3. Relative inefficiency in subsequent cities 
 
Some interesting information is also provided by comparing efficiency of private and public 
operators within the range of individual towns (comp. graph 3). It clearly shows diversity of 
absolute inefficiency between separate towns as well as local differences between private and 
public operators. 
And thus only in one town (M) private operators turned out to be more expensive than public 
ones; however then they owned only 0.5% of the market share in this town and serviced a 
very specific market segment. At present their share has significantly increased since they 
clearly won biddings with a public operator. 
However there are towns, e.g. a large town B (over 1500 services), where private operators 
run more then 20% of the network, reaching inefficiency of 27% compared to municipal 
operator’s relative inefficiency equalling 60%. It means an over 20% saving possible to 
achieve in the case of putting up tasks accomplished by this public company for tendering. 
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Graph 4. Distribution of relative inefficiency – private vs. public 
 
Graph 4 also well conveys the diversity of operators’ efficiency. It shows that if in the case of 
private operators over 75% of tasks reach inefficiency not exceeding 30%, in the case of 
public companies almost 70% of operators exceed this value. Nevertheless, there is a group of 
communal operators who maintain very high efficiency, the more so that is some cases they 
have a wider scope of tasks (there is no separate PTA).   
 Tendering efficiency analysis 
A level of efficiency also depends on specific solutions within the Competitive Tendering 
(CT) tactics used in a given town. Thanks to using appropriate methods, it is possible to 
increase efficiency of this process significantly, usually simultaneously ensuring high quality 
services and protecting against the risk of private monopoly or oligopoly. 
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Graph 5. Relative inefficiency according to the number of services within a contract 
 
 
 
Analysing efficiency depending on the number of services within a contract (comp. graph 5), 
we may come to a conclusion that contracts for a large number of transport tasks, over 60, are 
the least efficient. It is due to the fact that such contracts are relatively difficult to execute and 
usually just one offer is submitted, which induces reflection whether such a tender is actually 
based on competition principles. Out of over 800 services covered by such large orders, more 
than 700 fell to municipal operators. The aforementioned doubts are deepened by the carried 
out analysis indicating that some contracting authorities use clauses seriously limiting 
competition; the already mentioned requirement to own suitable buses at the moment of 
submitting a tender is the most popular among them.  
 
In turn, high efficiency is characteristic of orders within the range of 20-60 tasks allowing 
competition between many operators, also those who do not have bus garages in a given 
town. Highly efficient are also contracts up to 5 busses which can be easily accepted even by 
small companies (however such contracts are relatively few). 
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Graph 6. Relative inefficiency according to the length of a contract 
 
 
An other factor differentiating CT efficiency is the period for which the contracts are 
concluded (comp. graph 6). In case of a used bus fleet, contracts for relatively short periods, 
however definitely exceeding 1 year, are a good solution. In case of a new bus fleet, longer 
periods are preferred, though a period exceeding 8 years causes higher risk, therefore lower 
efficiency. 
 
It can be caused also by the fact that in Poland indexation of operators’ remuneration by 
inflation prevails, which does not take into consideration either high dynamics of fuel or wage 
costs or even declining, due to congestion, speed in towns. Introducing more advanced 
indexation methods will certainly bring about a further increase of efficiency of longer-term 
contracts, even those over 8 years.     
 
The other cause is, that the longest contracts are more often pro forma tenders, aiming to 
award the services to a communal operator, similarly as in the case of the biggest orders over. 
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Graph 7. Relative inefficiency according to the number of tender contracts in the city 
 
 
The number of contracts concluded by one transport authority (comp. graph 7) is yet another 
factor influencing efficiency demonopolization of urban transport systems. This variable has a 
very interesting distribution as there is a large group of PTAs which have up to 10 (usually 
fewer than 5-6) contracts concluded under the tender procedure and 2 PTAs which concluded 
a significantly grater number of contracts, reaching some 100. It is the second group of 
authorities that actually reach higher efficiency on account of high dynamics of the market 
making it attractive for many private operators.  
CONCLUSIONS  
The prepared econometric models show that tendering of public transport results in a 
considerable improvement of efficiency. It forces public firms to achieve efficiency level 
similar to that of private operators, although following the results of particular tendering cases 
indicates that it is not always possible. Sometimes tenders are won by municipal operators on 
account of terms restricting competition, while sometimes the firms getting a part of their 
orders under the direct award procedure are able to tender remaining services at prices lower 
than average, which will soon be forbidden by The European Parliament and the Council of 
Europe Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 of 23rd October 2007. 
 
Also an analysis at the level of separate towns points to lower costs incurred by private than 
by public operators. 
 
However, a positive difference between efficiency of public operators acting for PTA under 
the direct award procedure and in a classic municipal monopoly comes as a surprise, 
especially if additional costs of PTA’s functioning are taken into consideration. It is the public 
operators’ receiving orders without competitive procedures from PTAs that is the least 
effective organisational form. This result came as a considerable surprise in comparison with 
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the results of earlier research and general beliefs that establishing such entities in itself is 
considered pro-efficient. It is also a contradiction of trends recently prevailing in Poland. 
 
It also needs stressing that there is a significant differentiation of efficiency between 
individual public operators, regardless of organisational structures in which they operate. 
There is a group of highly efficient companies as well as a group of much less efficient ones. 
This may be explained by inside organisational solutions, which are not included within the 
scope of this research.  
 
The observed differentiation causes that the decision concerning demonopolization of urban 
transport is not obvious – it should be made on the basis of a current audit concerning urban 
operator’s costs related to valuation of potential of actual introducing competition in a given 
town. This should prevent stopping demonopolization at the moment of setting up PTA and 
generating additional cost, but before introducing CT and achieving the expected benefits.  
 
Also designing a tendering system we should look for solutions conductive to constant 
competition between operators; these solutions include dividing network into small bundles 
up to 60 services, concluding long-term contracts, though not longer than 8 years (and up to 3 
years on used rolling stock). Also a creation of a dynamic market is essential. This dynamics 
can be achieved with a smaller number of contracts, even if every year 1-2 tenders are 
organised for 20 services. 
 
With such a structure of tendering systems – still rather rare in Poland – a greater diversity of 
efficiency between private and public operators should take place. However, a possibility of 
gradual cease or privatisation of a municipal operator who will be unable to satisfy market 
requirements should be taken into consideration.   
 
It also needs emphasizing that the analyses made in the doctoral dissertation – not included in 
this work on account of its volume – showed that available fragmentary data suggest a rather 
positive than negative influence of demonopolization on the number of passengers carried, 
which authorises to use cost as an efficiency indicator.         
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